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would seem, then, that a claimant should be permitted to testify
if supported by witnesses testifying to circumstances.
Graydon K. Kitchens, Jr.

EVIDENCE

-

UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND

SEIZURE

-

PRE-TRIAL MOTION To SUPPRESS

Defendants were indicted for criminally receiving and concealing stolen property. Before trial they moved for an order
to suppress evidence on the basis that it was obtained as the
result of an unreasonable search and seizure.' New York law2
contained no procedure for the suppression of such evidence.
The Queens County Court of New York, held, motion granted to
the extent that a pre-trial hearing should be held. The trial
court has the power, even in the absence of express statutory
authorization, to consider and pass upon the propriety of suppressing evidence prior to trial. People v. DuBois, 221 N.Y.S.
2d 21 (Queens Cy. Ct. 1961)
In Weeks v. United States3 the United States Supreme Court
held that it was prejudicial error in a federal criminal prosecution to admit evidence obtained by federal officers through
means violative of the fourth amendment. However, the court
specifically stated that the amendment was not directed to the
misconduct of state officers. 4 Later, in Wolf v. Colorado,5 the
Court decided that the principle of privacy underlying the fourth
amendment was protected against arbitrary state action as a
part of the concept of ordered liberty embodied in the fourteenth
amendment. Nevertheless, the fourteenth amendment was held
not to forbid the admission in state courts of evidence obtained
by unreasonable searches and seizures. In 1961 the Supreme
were not "eye-witnesses" to the agreement to reward the claimant, the court said
they met the requirement of a witness other than the claimant.
1. One defendant's affidavit stated that the police officers had forced open

the door of her home, entered without her consent, and conducted a search without
a search warrant.

The police affidavit denied these assertions.

People v. DuBois,

221 N.Y.S.2d 21 (Queens Cy. Ct. 1961).
2. This was due to New York's long history of admission of evidence obtained
through illegal searches and seizures. See People v. Richter's Jewelers, 291 N.Y.
161, 51 N.E.2d 690 (1943) ; People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926)
People v. Adams, 176 N.Y. 351, 61 N.E. 636 (1903).

3. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
4. Id. at 398.

5. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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Court in part overruled Wolf in Map v. Ohio,6 holding that
state courts are compelled to exclude evidence obtained by state
officers in violation of the fourth amendment prohibition against
arbitrary police intrusion. Four Justices were of the opinion
that the exclusionary rule is a necessary ingredient of the fourth
amendment which applies in toto against the states through the
fourteenth amendment. Mr. Justice Black did not agree that
the exclusionary rule is part and parcel of the fourth amendment but concurred in the result reached, on the basis that the
fourth amendment in tandem with the fifth operates directly
against the states to compel the exclusion of such evidence.
The 1904 case of Adams v. New York7 established, in federal law, the premise that the means of obtaining evidence would
not be inquired into upon trial so long as the evidence is otherwise competent. The Weeks case, in establishing the exclusionary rule, distinguished the Adams case as presenting a situation
where the defendant had failed to move seasonably for a return
and suppression of the evidence unlawfully obtained. Upon the
strength of this decision the federal courts proceeded to fashion
a general proposition that an objection to evidence as obtained
by an unreasonable search and seizure comes too late where it
has been made for the first time at the trial, and not by a pre8
trial motion to return the property or suppress the evidence.
Exceptions to the rule were found in cases where there was no
opportunity to present the matter in advance of trial9 or where
prior testimony had established as indisputable the fact of the
unreasonable search and seizure.'0 In recent years the federal
courts have modified the requirement by allowing the trial court
in its discretion to entertain the motion for the first time at
the trial." Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is substantially a codification of this jurisprudence:
6. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
7. 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
8. See Segurola v. United States, 275 U.S. 106 (1927); Williams v. United

States, 215 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1954) ; United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69 (7th
Cir. 1954) ; Garhart v. United States, 157 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1946) ; Rose v.
United States, 149 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1945) ; United States v. Werneeke, 138
F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 771 (1944).
9. Angello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) ; Gouled v. United States, 255
U.S. 298 (1921).

See Segurola v. United States, 275 U.S. 106 (1927).

10. Angello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) ; Amos v. United States, 255
U.S. 313 (1921).
11. Panzich v. United States, 285 Fed. 871 (9th Cir. 1923) ; United States v.
Leiser, 16 F.R.D. 199 (D. Mass 1954) ; United States v. Johnson, 76 F. Supp. 538
(M.D. Pa. 1947). See United States v. Asendio, 171 F.2d 122 (3d Cir. 1948);
'People v. Berger, 282 P.2d 509 (Calif. 1955).
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"A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
may move... for the return of the property and to suppress
for use as evidence anything so obtained. ... The judge shall
receive evidence on any issue or fact necessary to the decision
of the motion. If the motion is granted the property shall
be restored unless otherwise subject to lawful detention and
it shall not be admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial.
...The motion shall be made before trial or hearing unless
opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not
aware of the grounds for the motion, but the court in its
12
discretion may entertain the motion at the trial or hearing."'
The New York court in the instant case was presented with
the problem of determining the character of evidence alleged
to be inadmissible under the Mapp decision without the authority of controlling procedural legislation.", In assuming the power
to determine the issue in advance of trial the court assimilated
its practice to that employed under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. No inconsistency was found under New York
law with the federal view that a factual dispute as to the legality of the search and seizure is triable by the court without a
jury, since the issue is regarded as not immediately relevant
to the question of guilt. 14 The court reasoned that justice to the
defendant and expedition of criminal litigation demand the
earliest possible determination of the question.' 5 The two-fold
purpose of the procedure adopted was deemed the enforcement
of the fourth amendment and the maintenance of a well-ordered
trial procedure.
As the federal motion to suppress evolved, there was uncertainty as to whether the exclusionary rule was an evidentiary
12. FaD. R. CRIM. P. Rule 41(e). For similar requirements in state courts
see State v. Lock, 302 Mo. 400, 259 S.W. 1116 (1924) ; Dalton v. State, 230 Ind.
626, 105 N.E.2d 509 (1952) ; People v. Grod, 385 Ill. 584, 53 N.E.2d 591 (1944)
Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 583 (1956).
13. For other recent state court opinions discussing this problem, see Thompson
v. State, 132 So.2d 386 (Ala. App. 1961) ; State v. Trumbull, 176 A.2d 887
(Conn. App. 1961) ; State v. Pokini, 367 P.2d 499 (Hawaii 1961) ; Shorey v.
State, 177 A.2d 245 (Md. App. 1962) ; State v. Valetin, 36 N.J. 41, 174 A.2d 737
(1961) ; Application of Bogish, 173 A.2d 906 (N.J. App. 1961) ; People v.
Gonzales, 221 N.Y.S.2d 846 (N.Y. Cy. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1961) ; People v. Angelet,
221 N.Y.S.2d 834 (N.Y. Cy. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1961) ; People v. Atkins, 221 N.Y.S.2d
780 (N.Y. Cy. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1961).
14. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927) ; Steele v. United States, 267
U.S. 505 (1925).
15. The court also noted that consideration of a motion to suppress in advance
of trial is consistent with its powers under state law to set aside indictments
found without evidence or upon illegal evidence. People v. DuBois, 221 N.Y.S.2d
21 (Queens Cy. Ct. 1961).
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or a constitutional requirement. 16 Now that the Mapp decision
has made clear the constitutional nature of the rule, perhaps the
waiver which could result from a failure to file the motion
before trial should be re-examined. It is arguable that such a
highly regarded right ought not be lost for mere failure to file
the pre-trial motion. 7 However, if such a procedure is established by statute clearly setting forth its requisites and providing for entertainment of the motion within the court's discretion
at any time, there would appear to be adequate opportunity for
a defendant to assert his fourth amendment rights. Without
some compulsion to dispose of the issue before trial, it would
seem that the result might be undue interruption and prolongation of criminal trials.
James L. Dennis

EXECUTORY PROCESS -

ANNULMENT OF SEIZURE AND SALE

FOR LACK OF AUTHENTIC EVIDENCE

More than five weeks after the sale of certain property under
executory process, the plaintiffs, heirs of the deceased mortgagor, sued to annul the seizure and sale on the ground that it was
not supported by sufficient authentic evidence.' This alleged insufficiency was caused by the failure of the clerk of court to
certify the copy of the mortgage presented to the trial court.
The defendant mortgagee had precipitated the sale, had purchased the property himself, and was in possession of it at the
time the heirs' action was brought. He contended that plaintiffs
were precluded 2 from attacking the sale because they had had
notice of the proceeding and had failed to interpose an objection
prior to the sale. The district court dismissed. Upon appeal to
the Fourth Circuit, held, reversed. A mortgagor or his successors
are not precluded from attacking a sale made under executory
16. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) ; McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332 (1943).
17. See United States v. Ascendio, 171 F.2d 122 (3d Cir. 1948) ; Application
of Bogish, 173 A.2d 906 (N.J. App. 1961).

1. There were also allegations of failure of the record to include evidence of
notice of appointment of an attorney to represent the succession, and a defect
in the advertisements announcing the proposed sale.
2. Actually, the defendant urged that "because of laches, the plaintiff was
estopped" to attack the sale. But neither the defendant's brief nor the court's
opinion seems to make any distinction between laches and estoppel. Because of
the ambiguity of the opinion on this phase of the case, it is assumed for the pur-

poses of this Note that the court meant that the plaintiff was not precluded from
recovering, either from inordinate delay or because of conduct inducing detrimental
reliance.

